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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1967
No. 67
]oHN W. TERRY, et al.,

vs.
STATE OF OHIO,

Petitioners,
Respondent.

BRIEF OF NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS'
ASSOCIATION, AMICUS CURIAE, IN SUPPORT
OF RESPONDENT.

Reasons for Filing an Amicus Curiae Brief.
For the reasons set forth below, the National District Attorneys' Association, ·with the consent of all
counsel in this case (see letters on file with the Clerk
of the Court), has filed this brief.
One of the basic issues underlying the instant case,
as well as two companion cases, Sibron v. N.Y., No.
63, and Peters v. N.Y., No. 74, is whether the Fourth
Amendment prohibits the police practice of temporarily
detaining persons in the "field111 on any standard2
1W e define the contept of "temporary field detention" in Part
I infra of our argument.
2 As is explained in Part I infra, we do not urge any particular
formula for the constitutional standard upon this Court, but
merely that the standard can be less than "probable cause to arrest," which is the standard urged by petitioner Terry. (See Brief
for Petitioner, p. 13.)
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-2less ·than probable cause to arrest. Our concern is with
the broad implications of this issue, not with its particular application to any given factual situation. Consequently, what we say herein will have relevance to
the two cases arising from New York to the extent
that the ultimate disposition of these cases touches
upon the basic issue which we discuss herein. We have
chosen, however, the instant case as the means for expressing our views because we feel that it permits a
broader consideration of the problem than may otherwise be permitted by the New York cases.
After considering whether the Constitution prohibits temporary field detention on a standard less than
probable cause to arrest and assuming the Constitution
does not, we next consider whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits a protective patdown3 incidental to such
a detention. Then, we consider the admissibility of physical evidence resulting from the protective patdown!
3W e

define the concept of "protective patdown" in Part I infra
of our argument.
4 We limit our consideration to the admissibility of such physical evidence, as distinguished from statements obtained during
the temporary detention, because of the factual context in which
each of the three cases now pending before this Court has arisen.
In each of these three cases the issue is whether or not physical
evidence obtained as the result of a patdown was properly admissible at the trial on the issue oi guilt or innocence. Collaterally,
in determining whether the procedures leading to the patdown and
the patdown itself do not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment,
it may be necessary to consider whether statements obtained prior
to the patdown are admissible in determining the propriety of the
conduct in light of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, in the instant
case the petitioner, Terry, gave a "mumbled response." 5 Ohio
App. 2d 122, 123-24, 214 N.E. 2d 114, 116 (1966). In the
Peters case the petitioner's response was characterized by the
Court of Appeal as "apparent chivalry." 18 N.Y. 2d 238, 241,
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-3The reasons that the National District Attorneys'
Association is interested m each of the three issues
set forth above is that the procedures termed herein
as "temporary field detention" and "protective patdown", as well as the admissibility of evidence obtained
thereby, have received recognition and approved in various states for which members of the Association
are counsel5 and are thus used by counsel in processing
criminal cases. Furthermore, as will also be set forth
with more particularity in the course of our argument,6 these procedures have an important bearing
upon the proper role of police in our society and thus
will affect the legal advice given to police officers by
the various prosecuting attorneys who are members of
the Association.

219 N.E. 2d 595, 597, 273 N.Y.S. 2d 217, 219 (1966). While
this is an important issue which has Fifth Amendment aspects, it
11eed not be considered herein since it appears that these cases
would not be a proper vehicle for deciding such an issue since it
has not apparently been raised by the petitioners in any of the
three cases, nor was it decided by the state courts below. In any
event, if the basic underlying right to conduct a temporary field
detention on a standard less than probable cause to arrest is sustained, the right to question would appear to be an integral part
of such detention which would not be subject to Fifth Amendment
incrimination since this type of detention does not constitute deprivation of freedom of action in a "significant way." Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). Rather it constitutes "general
on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or general
questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process" which was
"not affected by" the holding of Miranda. 384 U.S. at 488.
5 See discussion in II,A,2, and III infra oi this brief.
6 See discussion in II,A,l, II,A,3 and II,B infra of this brief.
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4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.
I.
Semantics.
Definition of the terms "temporary field detention"
and "prot~ctive patdown," as well as indicating the
proposed solution to the use of these police investigative devices.
We urge that a constitutional standard for these
two investigatory techniques be adopted without specifically setting forth any particular formula for such
standard in order that each state may have sufficient
flexibility to develop its own semantic definition and
conceptual underpining of that standard. This Court
would thus play the same role in determining whether
that standard has been met, as it does in determining
whether or not probable cause for a search warrant
or an arrest exists, nam~ly, review of each case to determine whether the standard established by the state
and applied to the facts of the case comply with the
Constitution.

II.
Temporary Field Detention, Protective Patdown and
the Admissibility of Evidence.
Based upon ( 1) society's need for the investigatory techniques of temporary field detention and protective patdown, (2) upon the acceptance of these techniques by society, (3) upon the recognition that the
abuse of power by unscrupulous police officers will not
be eliminated or reduced by eradicating these techniques
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-5at the expense of those officers who conscientiously
attempt ~o comply with the Constitution, and ( 4) upon
the interpretations given to the Fourth Amendment by
this Court in the past, we contend that evidence obtained by the proper use of these techniques is admissible in a state trial.

III.
California.
The State of California, in a sense, is an experimental laboratory in which the judiciary has been able to
impose constitutional standards with respect to these
techniques which distinguish lawful police investigatory techniques from abuse of power, while protecting
both the individual citizen and society as a whole.
1
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--&ARGUMENT.
I
SEMANTICS.

The phrase "temporary field detention" is used herein to mean those situations in which a citizen is stopped
by a police officer for investigation in the field while
either a pedestrian, or occupant of a vehicle at a time
when the officer stopping the citizen does not have
probable cause to arrest the citizen. 7 It thus includes
the so-called "stop" part of "stop and frisk." We use
the phrase "protective patdown" to indicate a cursory
running of the officer's hands over the outer garments of a person who is stopped which may lead to a
search of what is contained in the garments if the cursory patdown discloses the possible existence of a weapon which could be harmful to the officer. We use this
phrase to make clear that we are supporting the use
of a cursory search of an individual only in those
situations where the facts known to the police officer
indicate it is necessary for the protection of the officer and not in those situations where it is used as a
subterfuge for an exploratory search.
Much of the literature, both from the commentators
and the courts, relating to the problems of temporary
field detention and protective patdown involves, in part,
semantic analysis. 8 It is quite clear that a distinction
'This brief is not intended to condone or support detentions
at a police station "for investigation," where probable cause to
arrest did not exist at the time the suspect was taken to the
station.
BThus in State v. Harbatuk, 95 N.J. Super. 54, 229 A. 2d 820
( 1967), the concept of detention was distinguished from arrest;
and see Foote. The Fourth Amendment: Obstacle or Necessity in,
the Law of Arrest. 51 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 402, 402-03 (1960),
for further semanticism.
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-7can be drawn both historically9 and practically10
between an arrest and a detention, as well as between
a protective patdown and a search. By narrowing the
concept of the words "search" or "seizure" as contained in the Fourth Amendment to only arrest and
intensive search situations one can completely eliminate
the problems posed by the trilogy of cases now pending
before the Court. However, we propose to assume, without conceding, that a temporary detention is encompassed by the concept of a seizure (although not within the concept of an arrest) and a frisk is encompassed by the concept of a search within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment. 11 However, this does not
mean that the only searches or seizures authorized by
the Fourth Amendment are those for which there is
probable cause to arrest, or consent or a warrant. 12
Indeed, this assumes the answer to the issue in the
same way as does one who says a detention is n9t an
arrest.
An additional area of possible semantic misunderstanding relates to the test which must be met in order
for a temporary field detention to be valid, if a standard less than probable cause for an arrest is permissible. This standard has received various semantic ex9 A probative analysis of the historical distinction between arrest
and detention (as well as of other problems inherent in the
trilogy of cases before this Court) can be found in Leagre, The
Fourth Amendment and the Law of Arrest, 54 J. CRIM. L.C. &
P.S. 393. 406-11 ( 1963).
10While it may be inconvenient for a citizen to be detained,
it is certainly less inconvenient than being arrested and taken to
jail.
11This appears to be the basis for the discussion of the constitutional right to detain in Leagre, supra note 9.
12 This is discussed in our brief in II,A.4 infra and in Leagre,
supra note 9.
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planations, such as "reasonably suspects,ma "reasonable
ground to suspect,m• et cetera, all of which, however,
are based upon the same premise, namely, that some
standard less than probable cause to arrest. is acceptable. We propose not to define this standard in this
brief since it may differ semantically from state to
state. Rather, we shall use the phrases "constitutional
standard for temporary field detention" and "constitutional standard for protective patdown" (or similar
conceptionalization) in the belief that each state should
be free to adopt whatever terminology it desires as
well as the conceptual bases underlying this terminology
so long as such terminology and the underlying concepts when applied to a particular factual situation,
are consistent with the standard required by the Constitution.
Thus it is our hope that this Court will recognize
the existence of a constitutional standard for temporary
field detention (which is less than probable cause to
arrest) and for protective patdown, and will not preclude the states "from developing workable rules governingm5 temporary field detention and protective patdown "to meet 'the practical demands of effective criminal investigation and law enforcement' in the States.me
Thus this Court would overturn only those cases in
which a particular temporary field detention ,or protective patdown was unconstitutional.

§ 180-a (McKinney Supp. 1966).
§ 2.
"Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34 (1963).

13

N.Y.

CoDE CRIM. PROC.

14UNrFoRM ARREST Acr
1

/bid.

16
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-9II.
GRANTING THE POLICE THE RIGHT OF TEMPORARY FIELD DETENTION AND PROTECTIVE
PATDOWN ON A STANDARD LESS THAN PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST IS THE ONLY EFFECTIVE WAY TO MEET "THE CHALLENGE
OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY."1 7

A. Temporary Field Detention.
1.

The Role of Temporary Field Detention in the Prevention and Investigation of Crime.

The three cases now pending before this Court are
demonstrative evidence of the role of temporary field
detention in meeting the challenge of crime by preventing the commission of serious criminal activity.
Thus, in the instant cases it is reasonable to infer
that petitioner Terry was prevented from engaging in
an armed robbery, petitioner Sib_ron was prevented from
engaging in housebreaking, and petitioner Peters was
prevented from engaging in the sale of narcotics. This
is undoubtedly an important task for the police to perf orm.18 Indeed, the need for the prevention of crime, in
addition to the apprehension of criminals who have already committed crimes, is evident from the fear for
17Title

of the 1967 report submitted by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice.
lS"It is better to have an alert police force that prevents the
crime than one that devotes its time to seeking to identify the
assailant after the life has been taken, the daughter ravished, or
the pedestrian slugged and robbed." Wilson, Police Arrest Privileges in a Free Society: A Plea for Modernization, 51 J. CRIM.
L.C. & P.S. 395, 398 (1960) .
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-10personal safety felt by citizens regarding walking alone
in their neighborhood after dark. 19
An additional important aspect of the role of temporary field detention which is not apparent from the
facts of the instant cases is the use of such detentions
for apprehending persons who have already committed
crimes, independent of those discovered during the detention. 20
The use of this method by the police is widespread
and has been found by them to be effective both in
preventing and investigating crime.21 As noted in the
See NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH CENTER, REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LA w ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, Criminal Victimization in the United
States: A Report of a National Survey (hereinafter referred to as
Field Surveys II) 72-74 ( 1967).
20See, e.g., Bell v. United States, 280 F. 2d 717 (D.C. Cir.
1960) where officers, hearing screams for help at 4 :30 a.m.
and seeing defendant running near the point from which the
screams had come, detained defendant for purposes of checking
on the distress call. Had the officers not stopped him, his identity might never have been _known and subsequent apprehension
entirely frustrated thereby. See also Wilson v. State, .... Miss.
.... , 186 So. 2d 208 (1966), in which a highway patrol officer,
having received a radio ca11 to be on the lookout for a lightcolored Plymouth station wagon in connection with a burglary,
observed one parked outside a restaurant and requested the occupants to wait a few minutes in order to speak with a sheriff's
deputy who was investigating the case. The deputy, arriving
shortly thereafter, found sufficient evidence to constitute probable
cause for arrest. Again, it is possible, if not likely, that without
the detention ultimate apprehension of the perpetrators would not
have occurred.
Indeed. of the 23 cases in the appendix to this brief, only
5 are not of this type. These 5 are Shipley v. State, 243 Md.
262, 220 A. 2d 585 ( 1966), People v. Peters, 18 N.Y. 2d 238,
273 N.Y.S. 2d 217, 219 N.E. 2d 595 (1966), State v. Terry,
S Ohio App. 2d 22, 214 N.E. 2d 114 (1966), Kavanagh v. Stenlnouse, 93 RI. 252, 174 A. 2d 560 (1961), Wilson v. Porter,
361 F. 2d 412 (9th Cir. 1966).
2 1 see MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY, REPORT To THE PREsrDENT's Co~rMISSION oN LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JuSTICE, A National Survey of Police and Community
19
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-11-

Task Force Report: The Police, prepared by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice:
"The police consider field interrogations to be
an important method of preventing and investigating crime, since they rarely encounter a crime in
progress. Normally, by the time a police officer has
Relations (hereinafter referred to as Field Surveys V) 327-31,
333 ( 1966). See also La Fave, Detention for Investigation. by the
Police: An Analysis of Current Practices, WASH. U. L.Q. (1962)
331, wherein it is stated at 336 :
"This practice, referred to by the police as 'field interrogation,' may be accompanied by a frisk of the suspect when
the officer deems it necessary for his own protection. Reports are often made of these field interrogations, which
may later prove most useful; for example, if a burglary is
later reported in the area where the suspicious person was
found, the police then have a particular suspect who can
be investigated further."
Thus, for example, we are informed by the Los Angeles Police Department that it recently inaugurated a system which
computerized field detention interrogation cards made out after
a person in a vehicle has been stopped for field interrogation
or arrested. Solely on the basis of l~ds obtained from the computerized field identification cards for such vehicle stops, 175
felony crimes, involving 67 persons who were not arrested at
the time of the field interrogation, were solved and led to the
filing of felony complaints against 48 of these defendants (in
some instances felony charges were not filed because, for example, the defendant was already involved in other criminal
charges or the victim refused to prosecute). The solution of these
crimes resulted from the utilization of field interrogation cards
from four divisions of the Los Angeles. Police Department during
the period January 1, 1967, to November 1, 1967. Because of the
success oi this program it is now being expanded to include ~11
16 divisions of the Los Angeles Police Department. However,
for purposes of meaningful statistics, it is impossible to determine how many field interrogation cards were filled out in situations where the police did not have probable cause to arrest at
the time of the initial stopping since such cards are made out
on any "good suspect," irrespective of whether probable cause
for his arrest existed at the time of his initial stopping. It is
clear, however, that as to these 67 defendants such probable
cause did not exist since they were never arrested at the time
of their initial detention. Unfortunately, the work of the Los
(This footnote is continued on the next page)
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-12arrived at a crime scene, the perpetrator has fled,
people have gathered, and confusion has ensued.
Further, the police believe that they can prevent
much crime if they are permitted to stop and question persons whose behavior strongly suggests that
a criminal act is being contemplated." (pp. 18384.)
Although the need for some investigation as to the
usefulness of this procedure was recognized in one of
the studies underlying the Task Force Report on the
police, 22 unfortunately no such study was ever conducted nor have we been able to find any probative inquiry with respect to the actual amount of crime either
prevented or solved as the result of the temporary field
detention technique. However, the mere fact that statistical analysis is not available which would indicate the
exact percentage or quantity of crime prevented or
solved does not mean that the need for temporary field
detentions is based on _mere speculation. (See the second paragraph of footnote 21, supra) for evidence of
the usefulness of field interrogation in solving crime
Angeles Police Department has not been geared for statistical
purposes to ascertain the percentage or number of persons who
are stopped in situations wherein probable cause to arrest does
not exist, but who are eventually arrested upon the basis of probable cause developed during the course of the temporary field
detention or developed later on the basis of leads derived solely
from that detention.
22See F-ield Surveys V, supra note 21, wherein it is stated at
336 :
"Second, because of the critical nature of the field interview contact, would it not seem consistent to evaluate the
practice in terms of the usefulness of the information gained?
Does it really, as speculated, enable an investigator to place
an occurrence or individual in a time-place context for the
purpose of successfully conducting inquiry? No evaluation of
this type seems to have been available! It should be given
some thought."
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-13which, however, cannot be transformed into any statistical percentage.)
First, the experience of the police has indicated to
them that it is a necessary technique and this certainly
should have some weight in determining whether or not
it is required in society, albeit police perception of
this need may not be subject to the same critical analyses which underlie some of the surveys prepared for
the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice.
Second, as will be set forth in the succeeding portion oi this argument, even those outside of law enforcement who have considered and studied the need
for this technique have concluded that such technique is
required in society.23 · The existence of overwhelming,
unanimous judicial and legislative authority in support
of this practice in 17 state jurisdictions and 7 circuits
of the Courts of Appeals is the type of evidence which
has previously been deemed "pragmatic evidence of a
sort"24 in situations where "it cannot positively be
demonstrated that enforcement of the criminal law is
either more or less effective under either rule [the exclusionary rule]."26
Third, we submit that it would be extremely reckless to strike down this technique merely on the assumption that, because its quantitative usefulness has
not been determined with exactitude, it is not a technique worth saving for society. If this assumption
proved later to be wrong, the results could be disas23See II,A,2 infra.

Elkins v. United States, 364 U .S. 206, 218 (1960), wherein
this Court considered the experience of both federal and state
courts in applying the exclusionary rule.
25Jbid.
24

665

-14trous in regard to society's ability to meet the challenge of crime. We suggest, therefore, that a more
appropriate way of approaching this problem is to accept the role of this technique in our society until
such time as its usefulness has been adequately disproved and to determine whether its role in society
can be sustained without infringing upon constitutional
protections afforded to citizens by the Fourth Amendment.
Before concluding our discussion of ohe importance
of temporary field detention to society in its struggle
against crirrie, we wish to point out a basic distinction
between the recognition of this interest in deciding
questions relating to the Fourth Amendment and those
relating to the Fifth Amendment. We are aware that
in Miranda v. Arizona, this Court indicated that the
need for a police technique cannot be weighed against
the privilege afforded by the Fifth Amendment because that privilege is absolute. 26 The Fourth Amendment, however, by its very terminology, makes it clear
that it is not absolute since it uses the word "unreasonable," thereby recognizing that some searches and
seizures are reasonable. Thus in construing the scope
of the Fourth Amendment this Court must apply a
balancing test.
To describe conduct as "unreasonable" is a value
judgment, not a statement of objective fact.27 Once
384 U.S. 436, 479-80 ( 1966).
Rabinowitz v. United States, 339 li.S. 56 (1950), the
Court states :
"What is a reasonable search is not to be determined by
any fixed formula. The Constitution does not define what
are 'unreasonable' searches and, regrettably, in our discipline we have no ready litmus-paper test. The recurring questions of the reaonableness of searches must find resolution
in the facts and circumstances of each case." 339 U.S. at 63.
26

27 In
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-15a search or seizure is deemed to be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, certainly the interests of
law enforcement can never justify violation of that
guarantee. However, in judging whether a particular
search or seizure is reasonable, the interest of society
in effective law enforcement must be weighed against
other interests, such as privacy and the desire to continue on one's way. Indeed, this Court, in interpreting
the Fourth Amendment, has given recognition to the
needs of law enforcement.
As this Court stated in Elkins v. United States: 28
"It must always be remembered that what the
Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures. . . .
[I] t can fairly be said that in applying the Fourth
Amendment this Court has seldom shown itself
unaware of the practical demands of effective
criminal investigation and law enforcement."211
2. The Use of Temporary Field Detention Has Received
Overwhelming Support From Society.

Almost without dissent every judicial body that has
considered the question of whether or not it is constitutionally permissible for the police to engage in the
practice of temporary field detention has upheld this
practice. We have set forth in an appendix to this brief
the 16 states and 7 federal circuit courts of appeals in
which appellate courts have considered and upheld this
practice. We have listed for each jurisdiction one recent leading case, even though there may be additional
cases supporting this practice from each jurisdiction.
Additionally, if a statute has been enacted in a ju2

s364 U.S. 206 (1960).
at 222.

211Id.
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-16-risdiction, we have included the citation to the enactment. In addition to the 16 states which have upheld
this practice by judicial decision, one jurisdiction has
a statute authorizing the practice but there appears
to be no case interpreting the constitutionality of the
statute. We have found no jurisdiction which has
struck down the practice of temporary field detention.
In short, judicial support for the retention of this practice is unanimous in this country.
The two national bodies which have most recently engaged in studies in this field have concluded that the
practice of temporary field detention should be retained
in our society. Thus, the American Law Institute recommends the enactment of legislation recognizing the
lawfulness and necessity oi this practice. 80 The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice recommends the continuation of this
practice as follows:
"If the police were_ forbidden to stop persons at
the scene of a crime, or in situations that strongly suggest criminality, investigative leads could be
lost as persons disappeared into the massive impersonality of an urban environment. Yet police
practice must distinguish carefully between legitimate field interrogations and indiscriminate detention and street searches of persons and vehicles.

"The Commission recommends:
State legislatures should enact statutory provisions with respect to the authority of law enforcement officers to stop persons for brief question30See ALI CODE OF PREARRANGEMENT
(Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966).
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-17ing, including specifications of the circumstances
and limitations under which stops are permissible.
"Such authority would cover situations in which,
because of the limited knowledge of a policeman
just arriving at the scene, there is not sufficient
basis for arrest. Specific limitations on the circumstances of a stop, the length of the questioning, and the grounds for a frisk would prevent the kind oi misuse of field interrogation that,
the Commission study also indicated, occurs today
in a substantial number of street incidents in some
cities. " 81
Finally, it should be noted that while empirical data
underlying the Commission's study appears to be rather
limited and the circumstances under which the data
was collected may be open to some close scrutiny, it
appears that an overwhelming majority of citizens interviewed did favor at least the right to stop a person
and ask bis name and address when he is anywhere
outside his home.82 Of course, we recognize that a
81THE

PRESIDENT'S Co11MISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF }t:STICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A
FREE SocIETY 95 ( 1967). See also THE PRESIDENT'S Co1.n.nsSION ON LAW ENFORCE!-IENT Az.;'D ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 183-85 ( 1967), wherein it
is stated at 184: "The Commission believes that there is a
definite need to authorize the poi ice to stop suspects and possible
witnesses of major crimes, to detain them for brief questioning
if they will not voluntarily cooperate, and to search such suspects
for dangerous weapons when such a precaution is necessary."
a2see THE UNIVERSITY OF MrcHICAN. REPORT TO THE PREstDENT's CoMMrssION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, 1 Studies in Crime and Law Enforcement in
Major Metropolitan Areas, Section II (hereinafter referred to
as 1 Field Si1rveys III, Section II ) 88 (1967), which indicates
that 79% of the residents interviewed would give the police this
right, independent of whether or not the officer believed the
person stopped had actually committed a crime.
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-18substantial portion88 of the citizens that would permit
such stopping and questioning indicated that this right
would depend on the circumstances.
Perhaps the answer most representative of our society, including the court decisions and national bodies
referred to above, would be the following statement,
given as a representative comment from personal interview data regarding the practice of temporary field
detention:
"'. . . practice is o.k., but the way it was carried out was unfriendly, abusive, etc. Not against
method, but how it is used.' " 3'
3.

An Absolute Prohibition Upon Temporary Field Detention Will Only Penalize Law Enforcement Officers Who
Are Conscientiously Attempting to Comply With the
Law, While at the Same Time Affording No Substantial Benefits to Those Whose Rights May Presently Be
Violated.

It is apparent that- while the judiciary, the various
national bodies that have recently studi~d this problem
and the citizenry interviewed support the practice of
temporary field detention, it is a practice which is susceptible to abuse. We do not condone or in any way
lend our support to the misuse of this .Practice. What
we do urge is that this practice should receive judicial
recognition by this Court to the extent that it is not
abused. We proceed now to discuss why entire elimination of the practice will not eliminate the abuse to
which it is presently susceptible.
While there may be some police officers who abuse
their right to utilize temporary field detention, others
33/bid. (The figure given is 23%. )
3
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'See Field Surveys V, supra note 21, at 334.

-19have conscientiously attempted to comply ~ith the law
and, because of such compliance, are not creating any
resentment within the environment in which they operate. The most graphic example of the possible extremes
to which the practice of temporary field detention can
be pursued is evident from Field Surveys IV of the
study underlying the Report to the President's C01nmission on Law Enforcement ood Administration of
Justice. That study indicated that whereas in San Diego
field interrogation was a primary target of citizen
complaint, in Philadelphia it was not a focal point of
such cricitism. 815
The following is the explanation given in the survey
for the lack of controversy regarding this practice in
Philadelphia:
"As commented on above, the field interrogation
procedure has provided little cause for controversy
in Philadelphia. This may be due to a rational use
of the tactic without compulsory overtones, such
as official or unofficial 'quotas'. Its apparent acceptance may also partly be due to the fact that
it may not be noticed as much in a large, sprawling eastern city as it is in a smaller, more compact western municipality. Another reason the public may not object to field interrogations is that
the Philadelphia Police Department has demonstrated that it is not a tool designed exclusively to
oppress minority group members."H
815THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT BERKELEY, REPORT TO
THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LA w ENFORCEMENT AND ~
MINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, 2 The Police and the Com1n1inity,

(hereinafter referred to as 2 Field Surveys IV) 170 (1966).
88ld. at 173.
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-20If the right to engage in temporary field detention
is judged unreasonable because it may be abused, there
would be no police procedure which could not be judged
unreasonable upon the same ground. Indeed if possibility of abuse is justification for holding unconstitutional a police practice based upon the exercise of judgment by a police officer, Mapp v . Ohio31 did not reach
the problem it was designed to solve, namely, unlawful
searches and seizures. Such unlawful conduct is still
present in our society, as is evident from the reported
cases:38 To carry the "logic of possible abuse" to its
rational conclusion, should arrests only be permitted
if based upon warrants of arrest because some arrests
presently are being made by police officers who exercise their judgment based on facts which the courts
sometimes find do not constitute probable cause for
the arrests? We submit that if the exclusion of evidence obtained as an incident of an unlawful arrest is
a sufficient . deterrent. to unlawful arrests, 39 why
should not the exclusion of evidence obtained as an incident oi a temporary field detention which does not
meet the constitutional standard for such detention also
be a sufficient deterrent to its abuse?

Thus. if the practice of temporary field detention is
judicially limited to its reasonable exercise, all that
this Court will have done is to legalize its proper use,
not its abuse. Indeed, to prohibit it entirely because
3i367 G.S . 643 (1961 ).
~RSee. e.g., Stoner v. California, 376 li.S. 483 ( 1964).

39 "0nly last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose oi the exclusionary rule 'is to deter-to compel respect for
the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available wayby removing the incentive to disregard it.' Elkins v. United States,
supra, at 217." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961 ).
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-21of its abuse while failing to give recognition to its
proper use "is to burn the house to roast the pig."40
Furthermore, prohibiting this practice entirely will
not alleviate the present abuse to which it is susceptible. Studies indicate that there are already in existence a number of police practices which could very
readily take the place of the abuse of temporary field
detention. Thus, instead of merely detaining a person
in the field for investigation, he could be brought down
to the station and arrested "for investigation"41 or
he could be arrested on some charge not directly related
to that which the police officer is investigating.'2
As noted ·b y one commentator:
"Pressure may be placed on the police to make
arrests too early in the investigative process.""
This Court recently attempted to alleviate such pressure in another aspect of search and seizure when it
stated:••
"The police are not required to guess at their
peril the precise moment at which they have probable cause to arrest a suspect, risking a violation
oi the Fourth Amendment if they act too soon,
B11tler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957).
See Field Survey V, supra note 21, at 336 wherein it is
stated:
"Although arresting an individual for investigative purposes. even on the basis of a specific suspected offense, is
patently questionable, the practice is nevertheless widespread
and fairly common."
42 PERKINS, ELEMENTS oF POLICE SCIENCE 297 (1942) . See.
Xote. Pliiladelplzia Police Practices and the Law of Arrest, 100
t;.PA.L.REv. 1182, 1205 (1952), regarding the "vagrancy
dodge."
4 3Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights, and the F<>urth
A111rnd111ent, SuP. CT. REV. (1960) 46. 65-66.
44 Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310 (1966).
•
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-22and a violation of the Sixth Amendment if they
wait too long."45
In short, we submit that present interpretations of
constitutional magnitude have not necessarily eliminated
unlawful police practices. The officer who would harass and abuse is doing so now; the conscientious officer is not ..If a police officer wants to roust someone,
he will continue to do so irrespective of whether the
practice of temporary police detention is judicially prohibited. The officer who would engage in abuse can
justify his activities under present law and even support them with perjured testimony where necessary.
Thus. granting the conscientious officer this additional
alternative will not increase the excesses of the officer
who is already abusing the powers of his office.
Should temporary field detention be upehld by this
Court, the judicial review of its exercise will serve to
educate the police as to the propriety of their conduct
in the field, a function of undoubted importance insofar as those police officers who attempt to conscientiously obey the Constitution are concerned. On the
other hand, total prohibition of temporary field detention would remove the opportunity for courts to define circumstances which constitute an abuse of this
practice, affording the conscientious officer no guidance
whatsoever as to what he should do in the proper
prevention and investigation of crime in the field, while
in no way restraining those officers who would abuse
their office irrespective of constitutional protections.
45To fail to alleviate the pressure to arrest surrounding circumstances which warrant investigation, but which are short of
probable cause to arrest, can only further immortalize a line from
Gilbert and Sullivan: "A policeman's lot is not a happy one."
Pirates of Penzance, Act II (Sergeant of Police).
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-23Furthermore, we submit that just as elimination of
this practice will not aid those whose rights are truly
abused in the field, it will not aid them in their attempts to obtain recourse from the courts for such
abuse. As recently stated by one oi the commentators:
"Pressure may be placed on the courts to water
down the standards for probable cause to make
formal arrests in order to avoid freeing obviously
guilty defendants because oi relatively minor invasions of their privacy."48
Indeed, this Court recently had occasion to note a
similar "watering down" experience relating to the admissibility of mere evidence. As noted in Warden v.
Hayden, 47 the various courts of appeals, being bound
by the rule of Goir,led v. United States, 255 U.S. 298
( 1921 ) , had been compelled to stretch the concepts of
instrumentalities of a crime or means used to commit a
crime in order to include the recovery of physical evidence which might otherwise h~ve been classified as mere
evidence. 48 We would hope that similar confusion
would not result in the law relating to probable cause
for an arrest because of a failure by this Court to
recognize the need for temporary iield detention.
4.

Temporary Field Detention Is Constitutional Without
Probable Cause to Arrest.

Probable cause tO arrest is oiten deemed to have
some magic quality of clairvoyance. 49 We submit
•&Barrett, supra note 43, at 66.
4 13g7 U.S. 294 (1967).
•B/d. at 309: "Pressure against the rule in the federal courts
has taken the form rather oi broadening the categories of evidence subject to seizure, thereby creating considerable confusion
in the law."
•9See Foote, supra note 8, at 406-07. lh this article Foote
(This footnote is continued on the next page)
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-24that merely stating that the proper test is probable
cause does not, ipso facto, create a formula which can
intuitively be applied to the facts of a particular case.
We submit that the establishment of concepts underlying a standard less than probable cause is no more
difficult than the establishment of the concepts underlying probable cause itself. Indeed we should hope
that difficulties in conceptualizing a standard would
not lead to judicial abnegation of this Court's clear
duty.
Recently a commentator undertook just this task of
analytically probing the conceptualization which would
be involved in establishing a standard for temporary
field detention as well as setting forth the constitutional validity of such standard. 50 After undertaking
this task, the author concludes as follows:
"The thesis of this paper is that a more flexible
compromise than today exists between the right of
privacy and legitimate police desires can be reached
within the framework of the Fourth Amendment.
The standard of 'probable cause' does not seem
to have satisfactorily done its job. The result has
been a hodgepodge oi 'vagrancy' statutes which
often do little more than to make 'being suspicious'
a crime and widespread evasion of the law. It
wouid ·be far better to face the issue squarely and
set up a system of intelligent safeguards which
protect the security of the individual and, at the
rails against the claimed ambiguity of standards less than probable cause to arrest, as if the concept of probable cause is so
clear to every Justice of this Court that it would never have
caused controversy within the Court in past cases.
sosee Leagre, supra note 9.

676

-25same time, do not unduly restrict the police in the
performance of their duties.
"Conceptually, this flexibility can be justified
within the Fourth Amendment by the detentionarrest distinction and a reliance upon the broad
provision contained in the Amendment's firs.t
clause. A test of reasonableness under all the circumstances may be the only solution to the present
problem which can honestly be said to fulfill the
policy of the constitutional provision.
"The sole objection to such a test must necessarily lie in its vagueness. Doubtless, this would
present some difficulty in initial application. Yet
there is no reason to suspect that the Court would
be incapable of eliciting fundamental standards
through a process of judicial inclusion and exclusion. Thus it would seem difficult to conclude
that the vice of vagueness is a sufficient reason
for discarding a formulation of reasonableness under all the circumstances ; a certain amount of such
vagueness is rather of the essence of a constitutional principle." 61
A similar innovation in the law of search and seizure
has been taken by this Court with respect to the concept of probable cause itself. For example, in Camara
v. Municipal Court/ 2 this Court tempered probable
cause for a search warrant with reasonableness by
holding that "reasonableness is still the ultimate standard. "53 This seems to clearly compel the conclusion
that the controlling concept in the Fourth Amendment
6lfd. at 419-20.
6 2 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
63 /d. at 539.
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-26is the standard of reasonableness and not the standard
of probable cause alone, since the Fourth Amendment's
requirement of probable cause for search warrants is
on its face an absolute requirement and could conceivably have been interpreted without the applicability of
the concept of reasonableness which is found in a separate clause of that amendment. 54
As a final note to the question of whether or not
such an investigative practice as temporary field detention is constitutional, we would recall the words of
this Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 65 which were as
follows:
"General on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of
citizens in the fact-finding process is not affected
by our holding. It is an act of responsible citizenship for individuals to give whatever information they may have to aid in law enforcement."58
These words would be !Jollow indeed if all they meant
was that while the Fifth Amendment does not prohibit
temporary field detention, the Fourth Amendment does.

B.

A Constitutional Standard for a Protective
Patdown Should Be Upheld.

If, as we urge, this Court adopts a constitutional
standard authorizing the practice of temporary field
detention, it would be "cruel and unusual punishment"
to permit the former practice without the necessary protection of a protective patdown. In a day and age
where attacks are being made upon the right of society
54See the discussion of the relationship of the two clauses
in Leagre, supra note 9, at 396-03.
~s384 U.S. 436 (1966).
6 6Jd. at 477-78.
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-27to lawfully impose the death penalty on the ground
that its imposition is "cruel and unusual punishment,'' 51
we should hope that the advocates of the abolition of
t11e death penalty would have as much concern for those
who enforce society's law as they do for those who enforce the law of the jungle. Recent statistics indicate
that the concern of police officers for their own safety
is not phantasmagoric. 58 The report of the President's Commission discloses that 203 of the persons
upon whom police officers used a protective patdown
were carrying either guns or knives. 119 We doubt that
one out of every five citizens in this country is carrying
a similar deadly weapon and thus we submit it is reasonable for the police to single out for protective patdown that category of persons whom they stop pursuant
to a constitutional standard for temporary field interrogation.
We recognize that the protective patdown, albeit initially an attempt to protect tJ1e life of the officer, may
culminate in a criminal charge solely based upon physical evidence which was discovered as a result of that
e.g., Hill v. Nelson, 271 F. Supp. 439 (N.D. Cal.
1967).
58 The Uniform Crime Reports for 1966 released by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation in a publication entitled, Crime in. the
United States, discloses at pages 45-46 that during the years
1960-1966, 41 police officers were killed while "investigating
suspicious persons and circumstances." This number of police
officers constitutes 12% of all the officers killed by felons during
this period of time. In - accord with the recent rising trend of
crime, the number of police officers killed in 1966 "by persons
whom the officers had stopped for investigation or interrogation
because of suspicion regarding their actions" was 18% of the
total officers killed in 1966 ( 57 law enforcement officers).
«>7 See,

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES 45-46 ( 1967).
1111see THE CHALLENGE oF CRIME IN A FR.EE SOCIETY, supra

note 31, at 94-95.
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-28patdown. This is true in the trilogy of cases now
pending before this Court. It should be noted, however, that this is by no means as common as this trilogy of cases would indicate. 60 The right to engage
in a protective patdown should obviously extend no
further than the purpose for which it was conducted.
Thus \ve would require a constitutional standard to be
established for the protective patdown which would be
reasonably related to the purpose of that patdown. We
do not condone an intensive search which evidences a
desire to explore hidden places for the purpose of finding evidence other than a weapon which may be dangerous to the safety of the officer. The factual situation underlying each case will determine whether or not
this constitutional standard underlying a protective
patdown has been met. 61
The representative recent leading cases set forth in our
appendix disclose that oi the 23 cases, in only 4 cases (including
2 oi the cases now before this Court) was physical evidence .introduced which had been found during the course of a protective patdown of the defendant's person. These cases are People
v. Peters, 18 N.Y. 2d 238. 273 ::\.Y.S. 2d 217, 219 N.E. 2d
595 ( 1966) ; State v. Terry, 5 Ohio App. 2d 22, 214 N.E. 2d
114 (1966); Con-unonwealth v. Hicks, 209 Pa. Super. 1, 223 A.
2d 8i3 (1966); Wilson v. Porter, 361 F. 2d 412 (9th Cir. 1966).
61In State v. Terry, 5 Ohio App. 2d 122, 214 N.E. 2d 114
( 1966), the following was stated:
"However, we must be careful to distinguish that the
'frisk' authorized herein includes only a 'frisk' for a dangerous weapon. It by no means authorizes a search for contraband, evidentiary material, or anything else in the absence
of reasonable grounds to arrest. Such a search is controlled
by the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, and probable cause is essential. White v. United States (1959), 106
U.S. App. D.C. 246, 271 F. 2d 829. Therefore, we hold
that, on the facts presented in the instant case, the 'frisk'
for dangerous weapons was valid as an incident to a valid
inquiry by the police. Each case must be decided upon its
own facts." S Ohio App. 2d at 130, 214 N.E. 2d at 120.
C0
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-29C. Evidence Recovered as the Result of a Protective Patdown Which Meets the Necessary Constitutional Standards Should Be Admissible.
In order to place the issue of admissibility of evidence recovered as the result of a protective patdown
in its proper perspective, it must be remembered that
we urge a constitutional standard ior such a protective patdown which will not automatically authorize a
protective patdown during every temporary field detention. The reasoning underlying the nonadmissibility
of such evidence appears to be that by making inadmissible all evidence recovered, whether lawfully or unlawfully, some pressure to engage in protective patdowns which do not meet constitutional standards will
have been alleviated. Such argument, although perhaps
superficially appealing, is patently fallacious.
At the present time police officers who are conscientiously attempting to perform their duty (such as
is apparently the case in Philadelphia, as noted above) 62
will engage in a protective patdown only when it is
necessary for their own protection, and not as a subterfuge for a general exploratory search. If this Court,
however, indicates to the police that it makes no difference whether or not the protective patdown meets
constitutional standards insofar as the admissibility of
evidence is concerned, what would deter any policeman
from always engaging in a protective patdown, even if
it does not meet constitutional standards? This Court,
if it holds that police may engage in protective patdowns which meet a constitutional standard but that
the evidence recovered thereby is inadmissible, instead
of prohibiting the abuse of this practice will have placed
82

See II,A,3 supra.

681

-30a premium upon its use in all situations. In short, if
this Court hold that protective patdowns which meet
a constitutional standard are to be recognized, it must
necessarily follow that the evidence recovered thereby
must also be admissible if an irrational dichotomy leading to police abuse is not to follow.
Additionally, it should be noted that although the
trilogy of cases presently pending before this Court all
involve evidence recovered during a protective patdown,
a substantial amount, if not the majority of evidence
discovered during a temporary field detention, is obtained by methods solely unrelated to a protective patdown.63 Unless this Court were to rule that all evidence
obtained during a temporary · field detention is inadmissible, we sµbmit that there is no logical nor practical basis for distinguishing between the methods whereby evidence is recovered during that detention so long
as the methods meet constitutional standards. Thus,
ii during a temporary field detention which meets constitutional standards, an officer visually observes narcotics which have been thrown away by the suspect
or known stolen property in a vehicle containing the
suspect, what justification can there be for admitting
this type of evidence and not admitting that which is
obtained by a protective patdown conducted in a constitutional manner? On the other hand, if this Court
were to hold that no evidence whatsoever which is recovered dufing a temporary field detention is admissible, the underlying purpose of the detention, namely,
to investigate possible criminal conduct, will have been
defeated. The form of temporary field detention will
exist but not its substance (except for verbal state63See
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note 60 supra.

-31ments made by a defendant, an issue which 1s not
discussed herein). 64
Finally, it should be noted that in those situations
where evidence is recovered during the protective patdown, in an overwhelming majority of cases it constitutes the very item for which the officer was seeking, namely, a dangerous weapon. 66 Thus, the admission of such weapons as evidence is merely consistent
with the purpose underlying the protective patdown.66
Indeed, in an age where society has shown a concern
for the availability of dangerous weapons, 67 one would
question judicial policy prohibiting the admissibility of
such evidence if discovered during a protective patdown comporting to constitutional standards.

III.
CALIFORNIA HAS ESTABLISHED WORKABLE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS FOR TEMPORARY
FIELD DETENTION AND PROTECTIVE PATDOWN.

We have pointed out previously that the concept of
probable cause is not an absolute standard capable of
intuitive perception. It is a judgment which is inherently flexible while at the same time permitting constituSee note 4 supra.
See 2 Field Surveys I II, Section I, supra note 32, at 87
(the designation "personal searches" at page 87 is deemed to be
the equivalent of a protective patdown).
:
6 "The amount of non-dangerous weapons discovered in a search
is insignificant. Ibid. This would seem to indicate that this procedure is not a very fruitful subterfuge if one assumes it is
being used as a subterfuge.
SiSee S.l, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), presently before
Congress (the so-called "Dodd Firearms Bill") ; See also Tm~
CHALLEKGE OF CRH.IE IN A FREE SOCIETY, supra note 31, Chapter 10 : Control of Firearms.
64

65
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-32tional judgment. Similarly, we contend that constitutional standards for temporary field detention and protective patdown can be established which would produce
distinctions of constitutional magnitude and which need
not be cloaks ·covering conduct violative of human dignity.
The use of a constitutional standard less than probable cause to arrest does not require that temporary
field detentions and protective patdowns be conducted
on police hunches, uncontrollable by judicial scrutiny.
Just as the courts are able to distinguish those facts
which constitute probable cause for an arrest from
those which do not constitute such probable cause, so
we are confident they can distinguish those facts which
meet a constitutional standard for temporary field detention and protective patdown from those which do
not. In this regard there may be cases in which the
courts have erred in applying this distinction, as well
as some jurisdictions ~here the courts may have completely failed to draw such distinctions. Such judicial
error should not be reason for complete abnegation
of judicial power with respect to this important issue.
Of all the jurisdictions which have upheld temporary
field detention and protective patdown on a standard
less than probable cause to arrest, the appellate courts
of the State of California have undoubtedly had the
most opportunity to develop and apply constitutional
standards capable of distinguishing proper and improper police practices in this area. This is true in part
because of the judicial recognition of this conduct for a
number of years, as well as the large number of decisions which have arisen litigating the concepts·under-
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lying the system. Thus we have chosen California as
a model jurisdiction68 for the purpose of convincing
this Court that the judiciary are capable of applying
constitutional standards less than probable cause to
arrest which can distinguish those practices which are
proper and those which are improper. 69 We thus
propose to undertake the task requested by a recent
commentator:
"If probable cause is no longer to be the test,
at least at the initial point of arrest, where is the
line to be drawn short of indiscriminate police detentions on hunch? No greater service could be
rendered to advocates oi change in the law than
the formulation of speciiic standards illuminating the limits of the proposed buffer zone which
would lie between arrest on probable cause and
the protection of the individual from intrusion
based on nothing more substantial than a policeman's hunch. 1110
68As in other states, there may be decisions in California
which have been erroneously decided on their facts or which fail
to draw necessary constitutional distinctions with respect to temporary field detention and protective patdown. This does not
mean, however, that the California courts do not have the necess:iry tools to apply this system properly or that on other occasions it has not been applied properly by the California courts.
Similar mistakes by California with respect to search and seizure
in other areas (see. e.g., Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483
( 1964), and Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 ( 1967)) have not
tarnished the renowned reputation and standing of the California
courts, especially the California Supreme Court.
69 Similar consideration of California occurred in McCray v.
Illinois. 386 U.S. 300 (1967), in which an amicus curiae brief,
deemed by this court to be "helpful," discussed the experience of
California. 386 U.S. at 306, n.7.
7 °Foote, supra note 8, at 407.
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-34A.

When Can a California Citizen Be Subjected to
a Temporary Field Detention?

The test established by the California Supreme Court
for temporary field detention is as follows:
"It is well established that a police officer in
the discharge of his duties may detain and question a person when the circumstances are such that
would indicate to a reasonable man in a like position that such a course is necessary to proper discharge.of those duties. " 71
Lest it be thought that such a test is so imprecise as
to permit blanket authorization for police conduct based
on "hunches," one need only consider the facts and
holding of the case in which this rule was announced.
In People v. One 1960 Cadillac Coupe12 a private
citizen found in a public place a kit containing apparatus
used in administering narcotics and reported this to
the police. During an i_nvestigation of this discovery,
a police officer saw defendant drive through an adjacent area in a 1960 Cadillac. The officer felt defendant was out of place in the Cadillac and thus
watched him closely. Defendant acted nervous and
watched the officer in the rear view mirror. He drove
out of the alley and parked immediately across the sidewalk from where the kit had been found. He left the
car and walked over to a barber shop, stopping to
look in the window. He then returned in the direction
oi his car. At this point he was stopped by the officer
and was nervous and evasive in answering questions.
The defendant lied about a prior arrest and denied
11 People

v. One 1960 Cadillac Coupe, 62 Cal. 2d 92, 95-96,

396 P. 2d i06, 708 (1964).
12/bid.
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-35knowledge of the kit. Thereafter, through a set of circumstances irrelevant to this brief, narcotics were found
on his person.
The California Supreme Court held the initial stopping unlawful for the following reasons:
"In the instant case the officers observed only
that defendant was nervous, appeared to be wary
of them, and that he parked his car adjacent to the
point where the kit was found and thereafter took
a rather aimless walk in the near vicinity. Further
observations by the arresting officer to the effect
that Reulman looked like an untruthful person and
as though he did not belong in the Cadillac are
not impressive and appear to add little to create
any real suspicion, even when we consider that
the officer was an experienced narcotics investigator, familiar with the conduct of suspects in like
circumstances. ( See People v. Cowman, 229 Cal.
App.2d 109 [35 Cal.Rptr. 528].) We find little,
if anything, to distinguish Reulman from any other
harried citizen who may have innocently parked
his automobile in the same spot as did Reulman.
The trial judge's finding that reasonable cause for
detention and questioning is lacking is thus substantially supported by the record. 78
•afd. at 96; 396 P. 2d at 709. See also People v. Henze,
253 A.C.A. 1083, .... Cal. Rptr..... (1967) and People v. Hitnt,
250 A.C.A. 377, 58 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1967). in each of which the
Court held the officer did not have sufficient cause to engage
in a temporary field detention. It should be noted that in addition to these reported cases in which the temporary field detention was declared unlawful, there are additional appellate cases
in California so holding which are not reported in an official reporter because of the rule in California that not all decisions need
(This footnote is continued on the next page)
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-36B. When Can a California Citizen Be Subjected
to a Protective Patdown?
The test established by the California Supreme Court
for a protective patdown is as follows:
"If the circumstances warrant it [a police officer] may in self-protection request a suspect to
alight from an automobile or to submit to a superficial search for concealed weapons. 111•
Here again, lest it be thought that such a test is
so imprecise as to fail to permit distinctions of constitutional magnitude, one need only consider the facts
and holding of the case in which this rule was announced. In People v. Mickelson76 an officer had gone
to a market where a robbery had just been reported.
The robber was described as a fairly tall white man of
large build with dark hair wearing a red sweater and
armed with a .45 automatic. While driving away from
the market 20 minutes later the officer saw a station
wagon coming toward him with two persons in it. This
was about six blocks from the market. The driver
matched the description of the robber. The station
wagon proceeded to drive around the area making numerous turns.· The officer overtook the station wagon
and observed the -passenger, the defendant in this case,
bend forward in the seat, forward and down and raise
be published. (See, for an example of such an unreported ruling
striking down a temporary field detention, People v. Dresslar,
Crim. No. 12.345 ( 1966), decided by the Coi;rt of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division 4.) Additionally, trial courts in
California are not required to render any written opinion in cases
where, because of an unlawful temporary field detention or protective patdown, they refuse the admissibility of evidence, resulting in the acquittal of the defendant.
14People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal. 2d 448, 450, 380 P. Zd 658,

660 (1960).
16lbid.
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-37back up. The officer stopped the station wagon. While
the officer was radioing for assistance, the driver
walked back to talk to him. The driver stated that he
was trying to get home, was lost and was looking for a
freeway. The assisting officers arrived. Defendant, a
passenger in the car, got out of the car on the request
of the police. The police then looked in the car and an
overnight bag was found stufied under the right front
seat. The bag was opened and found to contain four
screwdrivers, a flashlight, a pair of gloves, and two
socks, one of which was full of nickels, dimes and quarters later determined to have been burglarized from
telephone booths. Defendant and the driver were arrested on suspicion of burglary. The officer stated that
his purpose in examining the bag was the possibility
of a gun being there.
The California Supreme Court held as follows:
"Both occupants were out of the car away from
any weapons that might have been concealed therein. Instead of interrogating Zauzig [the driver]
and defendant with respect to the robbery or requesting them to accompany the officers the few
blocks to the market for possible identification, the
officer elected to rummage through closed baggage found in the car in the hope of turning up
evidence that might connect Zauzig with the robbery. That search exceeded the bounds of reasonable investigation. 1176
i6Jd. at 454; 380 P. 2d at 662.
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-38C.

In Those Situations Where a Protective Patdown Is Permissibie, to What Degree of Probing Must a California Citizen Be Subjected as
Part of the Protective Patdown?

The California Supreme Court has 1 so far, not had
occasion to verbalize a test for the degree of probing
permissible as an incident of a protective patdown.
However, at least one court of appeal has discussed this
problem and has made a significant constitutional distinction between proper and improper practices.
In People v. Martines71 two officers noticed defendant and two companions at 1 :15 a.m. walking
through an unlighted alley at the rear of a closed business area. The officers stopped defendant and asked
him for identification. Defendant stated that he had
none. One officer made a cursory search of defendant
due to the darkness in the alley and for his own safety.
The search was only oi the outside of defendant's clothing. The officer felt a_n object that appeared to be a
knife in defendanfs pocket. In attempting to remove
the knife he removed a paper wad which was found to
contain 9 marijuana cigarettes. Defendant made no
threatening moves or offensive or aggressive statements. The object thought possibly to be a knife was a
combination metal nail file-bottle opener. When closed
it was 0 inch wide 1 0 inch thick and 2>:4 inches
long. When opened it contained a small blade, a nail
file and a bottle opener.
The Court of Appeal stated as follows:
"In the circumstances a cursory search was
warranted. Nothing was revealed by the cursory
11228 Cal. App. 2d 245, 39 Cal. Rptr. 526 ( 1964).
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-39search which warranted the officer in emptying
appellant's pocket as he did....
"In the case at bar it seems that the cursory
search made should have reassured the officer rather than have alarmed him.ms
From the above study of California cases it is apparent that those who would detract from the feasibility of establishing a constitutionai standard for temporary field detention and protective patdown on the
ground that it is impossible to establish a standard
which will be capable of distinguishing proper from improper police conduct simply do not give the judiciary
due credit for their abilities.

CONCLUSION.
It would be naive to state that members of minority
groups are never harassed by the practice of temporary
field detention and protective patdowns. It is just as
naive to tell policemen that . they do not need to use
either of these practices in their work. Irrespective of
the degree of truth in either of these statements, undoubtedly each of these opinions is the prevailing view
d. at 248; 39 Cal. Rptr. at 528. Accord, People v. Simon,
45 Cal. 2d 645, 290 P. 2d 531 (1955), wherein the California
Supreme Court, although not stating any general rule relating to
the intensity with which a protective patdown could be conducted,
applied its conception of such intensity in the following language;
"Even if it were conceded that in some circumstances an
officer making such an inquiry might be justified in running
his hands over a person's clothing to protect himself from
an ·attack with a hidden weapon, certainly a search so intensive as that made here could not be so justified. . . . In the
present case the officer searched first and asked questions
only after his search uncovered the incriminating cigarette,
and there is nothing to indicate that had he confined himself
to a reasonable inquiry, he would have discovered anything
to confirm his suspicion that defendant had no lawful right
to be where he was." 45 Cal. 2d at 650, 290 P. 2d at 534.
18[
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--40within the particular group under consideration, i.e.,
the minority groups and the policemen. It would certainly be worthy of the dignity of the law if it could
give recognition to both these views in such a way as
to accommodate both. This would truly benefit minority groups as well as policemen in their respect both
for each other and for the law. Thus there would be
"no war between the Constitution and common
sense."79
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